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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court, in a series of cases, has held that children are
different. For the purposes of criminal sentencing, this has meant that it is
constitutionally impermissible to sentence a juvenile to death,' or to impose
a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for
non-homicide offenses committed when the juvenile was under the age of
eighteen.2 While the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of
sentences like these on minors who are tried and convicted in criminal court,
the Court rejected a categorical rule barring the imposition of a life sentence
in homicide cases, stating that a juvenile may not be sentenced to LWOP in
the absence of an individualized-but "uncommon"-determination that
such punishment is warranted.3 Some state courts also have begun to strike
down their own sentencing schemes in light of the Supreme Court's

holdings.

Joseph S. Platt -Porter Wright Morris and Arthur Professor of Law and Director,
Center for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies, The Ohio State University Michael E.
Moritz College of Law. This Article draws on an earlier piece. See Katherine Hunt Federle,
The Right to Redemption: Juvenile Dispositionsand Sentences, 77 LA. L. REv. 47 (2016).

1.
2.
3.
4.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
See, e.g., State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Iowa 2014) (rejecting mandatory

minimum adult sentences imposed on juveniles); Diatchenko v. Dist. Atty for Suffolk Dist.,

466 Mass. 655, 673, 1 N.E.3d 270, 286 (2013) (abolishing life without parole sentences for
juveniles); State v. Aalim, No. 2015-0677, 2016 WL 7449237, 2016-Ohio-8278, ¶ 25 (Dec.
22, 2016) (holding mandatory transfer provisions violate the Ohio Constitution's due process
clause).
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It is less than clear to what extent these rules apply to juvenile court
proceedings. The parameters of the Eighth Amendment suggest that it may
have limited applicability or utility when children are tried in a system
specially designated for them. Moreover, because the construct of "child" is
mutable and contextual, it is not entirely clear when one is no longer a
"child." The Court seems to suggest that the construct of child is
ascertainable, but whether that is the result of state law distinctions or of
some other method of line drawing is unclear. The difference, however, is an
important one in a rights discourse in which capacity is a prerequisite to
having and exercising rights and where children generally are categorically
excluded from the class of rights holders.
The absence of a coherent theoretical framework in which to account for
children's rights makes resolution of some of these difficulties challenging.
If, however, we begin to think about rights in terms of powerlessness rather
than capacity, we can accommodate children as rights holders. From this
perspective, rights flow to the less powerful; rights accord respect for the
powerless and demand the attention of powerful elites. In the specific
context of sentencing and disposition, articulating a child's right to
redemption is possible within a framework of powerlessness. This Article
explores the contours of a right to redemption and suggests some of its
ramifications in the juvenile justice system.
II. THE RIGHT To REDEMPTION

The concept of redemption is a familiar one in international law. The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC") recognizes
that when a child is charged with or convicted of violating a State Party's
penal law, the child has the right to be "treated in a manner consistent with
the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth."' In so recognizing
the child's right, a State Party must take into account the "child's age, the
desirability of promoting the child's reintegration into society, and the
child's assumption of a constructive role in society." 6 Article 40(3) mandates
the use of specialized procedures for juveniles accused of violating the law
and encourages the use of nonjudicial proceedings whenever "appropriate
and desirable." As an alternative to punishment, Article 40(4) requires

5. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 40(1), Nov. 20, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 1448, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
6. Id.
7.
Id at art. 40(3).
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States Parties to provide a "variety of dispositions ... appropriate to their
well-being and proportionate both to their circumstances and the offence."
The United States Supreme Court has found the provisions of the CRC
instructive in the Eighth Amendment context, despite the fact that the United
States is the only country that has not ratified the CRC. In Roper v.
Simmons, for example, the Court noted that Article 37 of the CRC expressly
prohibits the capital punishment of offenders who committed their crimes
when they were under 18 in reaching its conclusion that the Constitution
also bars the imposition of death on minor offenders.9 In Graham v. Florida,
the Court held that the Constitution categorically bars the imposition of life
without the possibility of parole for non-homicide offenses committed by
juveniles, again citing to Article 37, which also prohibits "life imprisonment
without the possibility of release .

.

. for offences [sic] committed by persons

below eighteen years of age."o As the Court bluntly stated, "the United
States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against" these
penalties for children."
But a concept of redemption also girds the Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence involving juvenile offenders. The Court's language suggests
that minors are not beyond redemption. In Roper, for example, the Court
contended that "juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for
failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment"12 and that
"[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a
minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's
character deficiencies will be reformed." 13 The Court also rejected the claim
that juveniles are "irretrievablydepraved" in Roper,14 Graham," and Miller
v. Alabama,16 noting that penalties of death and life without the possibility of
parole are a "denial of hope." 17 As the Court declared, "juvenile[s] should

8.
Id at art. 40(4).
9.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-76 (2005).
10. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010) (quoting Convention on the Rights of the
Child, art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3).
11. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577.
12. Id at 570 (emphasis added).
13. Id (emphasis added).
14. Id (emphasis added).
15. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
16. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Roper,
543 U.S. at 570).
17. Graham, 560 U.S. at 70 (emphasis added) (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d
944, 944 (Nev. 1989)).
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not be deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and selfrecognition of human worth and potential."
The Court's acknowledgment that "children are constitutionally
different from adults"19 is significant to the construction of rights. Juveniles
are not simply "miniature adults"20 but unique constitutional persons to
whom special principles must apply. "[Y]outh matters,"21 the Court
declared, because children lack maturity and are impulsive. Youth matters
because children are subject to negative influences and peer pressure, and
have less control over their environments. Youth matters because children
are less developed and therefore capable of change. Thus, the law often
makes special accommodations for juveniles: "[i]ndeed, it is the odd legal
rule that does not have some form of exception for children."22
It is their difference and the promise that their difference holds that
requires the special treatment of children at sentencing. For the Court, these
differences mean that the justifications for punishment apply with less force
to juveniles. For example, retributivist justifications for punishment are not
as great because children are less morally culpable due to their immaturity
and diminished sense of responsibility.23 It also is less likely that juveniles
can (or will) engage in a cost-benefit analysis before offending, given their
impetuosity.2 4 Similarly, the incapacitation of children divorced from a
consideration of their potential for change as they gradually mature is
unjustifiable.25
Clearly, these cases have direct applicability to juvenile transfer
schemes. The Court rejected any claim that the discretion exercised when
making the decision to transfer a juvenile to criminal court for trial is the
constitutional equivalent of the discretion that must be exercised at
sentencing. Certainly, when waiver is mandatory, no discretion is ever

18. Id. at 79.
19. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. See also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732
(2016) (confirming that the Court was announcing a constitutional rule when the Court held
that the rule articulated in Miller was a new substantive constitutional rule retroactive in cases
on state collateral review).
20. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470 (citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274
(2011)).
21. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
22. Id. at 2470.
23. See id. at 2465 (explaining that because of youth's distinctive attributes, retributivist
justifications for imposing harsh sentences are not as strong for youth as for adults) (citing
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005)).
24. Id. (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 72).
25. See id. (explaining that a life-without-parole sentence is at odds with a child's
capacity for change) (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 74).
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exercised.26 The discretion exercised by a prosecutor also is constitutionally
inadequate in the absence of judicial evaluation or review.27 But even the
decision to transfer by a juvenile court judge is insufficient because of the
lack of information generally available to the juvenile court when the judge
orders the child waived28 and the real possibility that the judge feels the
minor warrants more punishment than the juvenile justice system can
impose.2
The Supreme Court's approach does pose some challenges when
thinking about rights. The first is contextual. The cases involve the
application of criminal sentencing schemes to children who had been tried as
adults and who had received the harshest penalties allowed in the criminal
justice system-death or a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of
parole.30 The Court approached the question within the framework of the
Eighth Amendment, a right applicable to all constitutional persons.31 Thus it
was the offender's status as a child that barred the imposition of certain
punishments, just as the status of mental disability would, but the child-asoffender seemingly presents no categorical constitutional bar to the
imposition of a life sentence if an individualized determination that passes
constitutional muster is made.32
Second, the Court's analysis raises directly the question whether
children have children's rights or whether they simply have rights as
criminal offenders.33 The distinction is an important one when thinking
through a jurisprudential framework that encompasses children as rights
holders. Whether children have rights remains hotly contested in the United
States, in no small part because there is no framing document, like the CRC,
to establish that children are rights holders.34 Rather, any consensus about
children's rights largely has developed as a result of their involvement in the
juvenile and criminal justice systems. That is, children have rights not
because they are children but because they are accused of committing
cnmes.

26. See id at 2474 (noting that in States with mandatory transfer systems "[a] juvenile
of a certain age who has committed a specified offense will be tried in adult court, regardless
of any individualized circumstances").
27. Id at 2474.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2475.
30. Id at 2460; Graham, 560 U.S. at 48; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005).
31. Id
32. Id
33. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 623 (discussing CRC).
34. Id
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For rights discourse, this is an interesting puzzle. At least within AngloAmerican traditions, competence is a prerequisite to having and exercising
rights largely because of notions surrounding social compact theory.35 Of
course, this construct of competence has made formulating rights for
children quite difficult. In the United States, this idea of capacity, or rather
incapacity, has created a legal framework within which children can be
simultaneously characterized as incompetent (to vote, for instance) and
competent (to stand trial and be convicted or adjudicated delinquent).36 The
determinations of capacity often are simply bright lines legislatively drawn
based on age37 (although the Court has made it clear that such rules may be
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, at least where a juvenile is
sentenced as an adult offender).
The Court's language about a child's "difference" thus directly
highlights the challenge posed by a rights theory premised on capacity. On
the one hand, the offender's special status as a child may warrant differential
treatment at sentencing, but does not necessarily preclude the imposition of a
significant sentence under the proper circumstances. Remember, too, that the
Court differentiates the category of "child" from that of "adult" without ever
really grappling with the fact that those categories are mutable and may be
determined simply based on legislative line-drawing; thus children are no
longer children when the legislature decides they are adults for certain (often
punitive) purposes.38 Certainly, we now have enough neuroscientific
evidence to know that full maturity for most individuals does not occur until
around the age of 25,3 far later than the age of adulthood set by American
penal codes. Even then, it remains unclear whether the Court's holdings
have any application to the quasi-criminal proceedings within the juvenile
court itself, a system that is designed only for children and that ostensibly
provides a more rehabilitative and therapeutic approach.
Approaching the problem from a different theoretical framework is
central to articulating a more coherent rights account for children. When
capacity is a prerequisite to having and exercising rights, children inevitably
are excluded from the class of rights holders. 4 0 Even in those instances in

35. Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A
PostfeministAnalysis ofthe CapacityPrinciple, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 983, 987 (1993).
36. Id at 1021.
37. Id at 997.
38. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2480 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 49-50 (2010); Roper, 543 U.S. at 588-90 (reasoning that children are different from adults
without referencing arbitrary line-drawing by legislators).
39.

Young Adult Development Project, THE MIT WORKLIFE

CTR. (July 2008),

http://hrweb.mit.edu/worklife/youngadult/brain.html.
40. Federle, supra note 35, at 987.
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which juveniles are accorded rights, little attention is paid to the contextual
application of those rights. Thus, as I have argued elsewhere, grounding
rights in understandings about power shifts the focus from capacity to the
essential powerlessness of the rights claimant.41 Mutable categories, like
"child" or "adult," constructed by powerful elites are not relevant to
determining who has a right; rather, rights flow to the powerless. 42 Thus,
children, as powerless beings, and not simply because they are children,
would have rights claims against the more powerful.4 3
The child's claim of a right to redemption thus serves as a check on the
state's exercise of power. That rights claim is more expansive than simply
the right against cruel and unusual punishment embedded in the Eighth
Amendment.44 The right to redemption looks beyond punishment and
envisions the reintegration of the child into society as a fully functioning
citizen. This right thus imposes on the state a correlative duty to provide the
means by which the child may have that future. Framing the right in this way
changes the narrative from what the state has the power to do to the child to
one in which the child may claim state-created opportunities for
rehabilitation and reform.
A right to redemption is necessary even in a system ostensibly designed
to accommodate children's difference. One consequence of the Court's
approach may be that the mechanisms for transferring children to criminal
court are unconstitutional. The Ohio Supreme Court, for example, recently
held that the state's mandatory transfer provisions violate the state's due
process clause. 45 Embracing the U.S. Supreme Court's holding that children
are constitutionally different from adults,46 the Ohio Supreme Court found
that juvenile procedures also must take into account these differences. 47 The
Ohio statutory provisions requiring transfer in the absence of any
individualized determination violate due process because they fail to
48
accommodate children's "special status."

Nevertheless, the right to redemption is meaningless if it might be
circumvented by discretionary judicial processes that simply penalize
children. The Ohio Supreme Court left intact the state's discretionary waiver

41. For a more complete discussion of the empowerment perspective, see Katherine
Hunt Federle, Rights Flow Downhill, 2 INT'L. J. CHILD. RTs. 343, 343 (1994).
42. Id at 344.
43. Id
44. Id at 366.
45. State v. Aalim, No. 2015-0677, 2016 WL 7449237, 2016-Ohio-8278, ¶ 31 (Dec. 22,
2016).
46. Id at 22.
47. Id at 25.
48. Id at¶¶ 25-26.
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provisions, finding that they were fundamentally fair because they took into
account the differences between children and adults by requiring a juvenile
court judge to determine the child's amenability to treatment in the juvenile
justice system prior to ordering the child's transfer to criminal court.49
However, the amenability determination may be grounded in the availability
and cost of treatment modalities, a factor that many state waiver provisions
list when a judicial transfer decision is to be made.50 Discretionary transfer
thus may continue to funnel children into the criminal system, without fully
accounting for their impulsivity and immaturity. A meaningful right to
redemption would directly challenge the state's power to punish children by
claiming that the state has failed to respect the child's capacity for change.
Juvenile justice systems also disable and disadvantage the very children
they process. Despite significant declines in the number of cases and
offenders handled by juvenile courts, youth of color experience court
involvement differently than white youth.5 In 2013, black youth comprised
35% of all delinquency cases and were more than twice as likely to be
referred to the juvenile court as white youth, although blacks constituted
only 16% of the youth population in the United States. 52 Moreover,
disproportionality becomes more pronounced and has more serious
consequences as cases involving black youth proceed through the juvenile
system. 53 For example, the rate at which referred cases were formally
processed was 20% greater for black youth than for white, and blacks
comprised 42% of all person offense cases in juvenile courts. 54 While white
youth were more likely to receive a disposition of probation, black youth, in
contrast, were ordered into residential placement after adjudication at a rate
that was 20% greater than for white youth.
Court involvement may actually make things worse. Most juveniles age
out of criminal offending as they mature.56 But by impeding the

49. Id at¶ 28.
50. Katherine Hunt Federle, Emancipation and Execution: Transferring Children to
CriminalCourt in Capital Cases, 3 Wis. L. REV. 447, 453-54 (1996).
51. JULIE FURDELLA & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
DELINQUENCY CASES IN JUVENILE COURT, at 1-2 (2015).
52. Id. at 2.
53. Id
54. Id
55. Id
56. LAURENCE STEINBERG, ELIZABETH CAUFFMAN & KATHRYN C. MONAHAN, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PSYCHOSOCIAL MATURITY AND DESISTANCE FROM CRIME IN A SAMPLE

OF SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS, at 9 (2015). The researchers studied 1,300 juvenile
offenders for seven years after conviction. Involvement in delinquent and criminal behavior
increased through adolescence, peaking at about age 16 or 17. Although a small number
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development of a prosocial lifestyle, institutionalization may delay
5
exhibit more
maturation; 57 juveniles are exposed to more anti-social peerss
59
aggressive behavior, and may have less contact with family members and
their community.60 Incarcerated youth may experience physical and sexual
victimization by other juveniles and staff, 1 which may increase their risk for
suicide or suicidal ideation.62 Juveniles experience educational disruption
because juvenile facilities tend to provide an inferior educational experience
for youth,63 and their physical health may suffer because of risks associated
with violence, sexual activity, substance abuse, or the more sedentary
lifestyle experienced while institutionalized.64
Conditions of confinement in juvenile facilities also underscore the
punitive approach taken by juvenile justice systems. The public facilities in
which most juvenile offenders are held6 5 often have fences or walls with
razor wire, internal security doors, or secure sleeping rooms.66 The staff in
training schools, reception, and detention centers use mechanical restraints,
like handcuffs, restraining chairs, strait jackets, leg cuffs, or leather straps to
67
restrain youth in custody, and will lock juveniles in their rooms. One in
five juvenile facilities experiences overcrowding,6 8 and suicide was the most
common cause of death among held youth.69

continued to offend, the vast majority stopped engaging in criminal behavior as they became
more psychosocially mature. Id. at 2.
57. Ian Lambie & Isabel Randell, The Impact of Incarcerationon Juvenile Offenders,
33 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 448, 454-55 (2013).
58. Id. at 451.
59. Id. at 452.
60. Id. at 454.
61. Id. at 452-53.
62. Id. at 453-54.
63. Id. at 454.
64. Id.
65. SARAH HOCKENBERRY, MELISSA SICKMUND & ANTHONY SLADKY, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, JUVENILE RESIDENTIAL FACILITY CENSUS, 2012: SELECTED FINDINGS, at 3 (2015).
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id. at 12 (indicating 58% of training schools used mechanical restraints and 47% of
training schools locked youth in their rooms for four or more hours; 46% of reception centers
and 40% of detention centers used mechanical restraints while 44% of detention centers and
32% of reception centers locked youth in their rooms).
68. Id. at 10 (indicating facilities holding between 1 and 10 residents reported the
highest rate of overcrowding at 24%, followed by facilities with 21-50 residents at 23%).
69. Id. at 13 (indicating that fourteen youth died in juvenile facilities in the one-year
reporting period between October 1, 2011 and September 30, 2012. Five deaths were due to
suicide, 4 were attributable to illness or natural causes, 3 were the result of accidents, and 2
were due to homicide. The death rate was higher for private facilities. Most deaths occurred at
detention facilities).
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The collateral consequences of juvenile adjudications are extensive and
may impact the juvenile well into his adult life. For example, juvenile
records may be made available to prospective employers who then may be
unwilling to hire a youth with delinquency adjudications.70 A child may be
required to reveal his prior juvenile court involvement on college and
graduate school applications or when applying for a professional license,
which could result in denial of the application.71 Sex offender registration
laws may require the youth to register well into adulthood, and may trigger
community notification requirements that may affect the juvenile's ability to
remain in a neighborhood.72 Both sex offender status and drug-related
convictions may result in the eviction of a juvenile and his entire family
from public housing, even if other family members were not at fault.73 A
youth may even be unable to enlist in the military, could lose driving
privileges, 7 4 or may even be barred from obtaining federal financial aid for
college.75
American juvenile justice is deeply punitive. The paradox is that justice
system involvement may actually result in more and deeper offending.
Although there is evidence that most youth will grow up and out of their
offending, prolonged exposure to juvenile justice system mechanisms may
delay or impede their maturation. In fact, juvenile court involvement may

70. Riya Saha Shah & Jean Stout, Future Interrupted: The CollateralDamage Caused
by Proliferation of Juvenile Records, Juv. L. CTR.
6, 11 (Feb. 2016),
http://juvenilerecords.jlc.org/juvenilerecords/documents/publications/future-interrupted.pdf
(one study found that black youth were more likely to be denied employment than white
youth).
71. Id. at 10; Christopher Gowen, Lisa Thurau, & Meghan Wood, The ABA's Approach
to Juvenile Justice Reform: Education, Eviction, and Employment: The Collateral
Consequences ofJuvenile Adjudication, 3 DUKE FORUM FOR L. & Soc. CHANGE 187, 194-96

(2011).
72.

See, e.g., KATHERINE HUNT FEDERLE, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH WITH CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTS 357 (2013)

(explaining that two federal measures, Megan's Law and Adam's Law, are based on an
assumption that sex offenders cannot be cured and that they will pose a risk to society
throughout their lives).
73. Wendy J. Kaplan & David Rossman, Called "Out" at Home: The One Strike
Eviction Policy andJuvenile Court, 3 DUKE FORUM FOR L. & Soc. CHANGE 109, 112 (2011).

74. Shah & Stout, supra note 70, at 9.
75. Id. at 11; see also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R.
3355, 103d Cong. (1994) (Pell Grant funding will be denied to anyone incarcerated in any
federal or state penal institution).
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have iatrogenic effects.76 Juvenile court involvement thus exposes children
to consequences that may last a lifetime.
III. CONCLUSION

What would a right to redemption add to the juvenile justice system?
As a rights claim, juveniles would have the power to require the state to
recognize that their differences be respected and accommodated. Thus, the
state must provide children with a future, one in which children may assume
productive roles in society. Rather than focusing on retribution and
punishment, the right to redemption requires the state to provide
opportunities for salvation through rehabilitation and treatment. And the
very processes by which the juvenile justice system handles children would
recognize their unique vulnerabilities and powerlessness.

76. Lambie & Randell, supra note 57, at 452 (stating that peer contagion could explain
this effect; that is, youths' confinement with other, more antisocial youths might result in their
further criminalization).
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